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Abstract: What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a 
subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The 
paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, 
because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of 
epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the 
level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an 
unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that 
we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our 
conscious lifetime, because while conscious cognition is unfolding, it 
often cannot be inhibited, suspended, or terminated. The instantiation 
of a stable first-person perspective as well as of certain necessary 
conditions of personhood turn out to be rare, graded, and dynamically 
variable properties of human beings. I argue that individual repre-
sentational events only become part of a personal-level process by 
being functionally integrated into a specific form of transparent con-
scious self-representation, the ‘epistemic agent model’ (EAM). The 
EAM may be the true origin of our consciously experienced first-
person perspective. 
1. M-Autonomy 
The two main claims of this contribution are, first, that for roughly 
two thirds of their conscious lives human beings are not mentally 
autonomous subjects, and, second, that what we traditionally call 
‘conscious thought’ primarily and predominantly is a subpersonal 
process. The argument is partly based on recent empirical research 
demonstrating the ubiquitous occurrence of ‘mind-wandering’, or 
spontaneous, task-unrelated thought. Examples of mind-wandering are 
daydreams, automatic planning, the sudden occurrence of unbidden 
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memories, or depressive rumination.1 Methods like externally cued 
experience sampling show how unnoticed attentional lapses leading to 
uncontrolled mental activity of this kind are much more frequent than 
most of us intuitively think. Mind-wandering is interesting for philos-
ophy of mind because its phenomenology as well as new empirical 
data bear direct relevance on our theoretical notion of ‘mental 
autonomy’ (M-autonomy). As it were, mind-wandering is the opposite 
of M-autonomy, because it involves a loss of self-control at the level 
of conscious thought. My epistemic goal in this paper is to find out 
how a more careful look at the phenomenology and novel empirical 
data can help to improve our conceptual understanding of what it 
means to be a mentally autonomous subject. 
Mental autonomy includes the capacity to impose rules on one’s 
own mental behaviour, to explicitly select goals for mental action, the 
ability for rational guidance and, most importantly, for the intentional 
inhibition, suspension, or termination of an ongoing mental process. 
M-autonomy is a functional property,2 which any given self-conscious 
system can either possess or lack. Its instantiation goes along with 
new epistemic abilities, a specific phenomenological profile, and the 
appearance of a new layer of representational content in the 
phenomenal self-model (Metzinger, 2003a). In humans, first insights 
into its neuronal realization are now beginning to emerge. From a 
philosophical perspective, this functional property is interesting for a 
whole range of different reasons. One of them is that it is directly 
                                                          
1  This paper is based on an earlier and more comprehensive publication of mine, which 
offers a first philosophical perspective on the recent surge of scientific work related to 
the phenomenon of ‘mind-wandering’ (Metzinger, 2013a). It aims at further developing 
only a few of its central ideas and leaves out as much empirical detail as possible, 
including my own empirical hypothesis that mind-wandering can be characterized by 
unnoticed switches in what I have called the phenomenal ‘unit of identification’ (UI) 
and an experimentally detectable ‘self-representational blink’ (SRB). In terms of recent 
references on the topic since my earlier publication, I recommend Smallwood and 
Schooler (2015) for a recent empirical review; Carruthers (2015, Chapter 6.5), Dorsch 
(2014), Irving (2015), and Pliushch and Metzinger (2015) are philosophical discussions. 
I am also extremely grateful to two anonymous reviewers, who have both offered very 
helpful, constructive, and substantial criticism, as well as to Carsten Korth and Wanja 
Wiese for additional comments. 
2  Functional properties are abstract properties referring to the causal role of a state (the 
set of its causal relations to input, output, and other internal states), without implying 
anything about the properties of its physical realization. Just like states described in a 
Turing machine table or computer software, they are multi-realizable. For example, as 
M-autonomy is a functional property, it could in principle also be implemented in a 
machine. 
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relevant to both our traditional notions of a ‘first-person perspective’ 
and of ‘personhood’. If one cannot control the focus of one’s 
attention, then one cannot sustain a stable first-person perspective, and 
for as long as one cannot control one’s own thought one cannot count 
as a rational individual. 
This paper is composed of three parts. First, I will briefly introduce 
the concept of ‘M-autonomy’. Part 2 will connect this new idea with 
the two notions of ‘possessing a first-person perspective’ and of 
‘personhood’, by enriching the functionalist concept with a dynamic, 
representationalist account: M-autonomy consists in the possession of 
an ‘epistemic agent model’ (EAM). Here, one central point is that the 
transition from subpersonal to personal-level cognition is enabled by a 
specific form of conscious self-representation, namely, a global model 
of the cognitive system as an entity that actively constructs, sustains, 
and controls knowledge relations to the world and itself. In Part 3, I 
will show that for the largest part of our conscious lives we are not 
mentally autonomous cognitive systems in this sense and conclude 
that what we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a sub-
personal process. 
Let us begin by pointing out how biological systems produce differ-
ent kinds of observable output, which can in turn be characterized by 
different degrees of autonomy and self-control. For the purposes of 
this paper, let us say that there are actions and behaviours. Both kinds 
of output are conceptually individuated by their satisfaction con-
ditions; they are directed at goal states. However, for actions, con-
scious goal-representation plays a central causal role, actions can be 
terminated, suspended, intentionally inhibited, and they exhibit a 
distinct phenomenological profile involving subjective qualities like 
agency, a sense of effort, goal-directedness, global self-control, and 
ownership. Behaviours, on the other hand, are purposeful, but possess 
no explicit form of conscious goal-representation. They are function-
ally characterized by automaticity, decreased context-sensitivity, and 
low self-control, we may not even notice their intitiation, but they can 
be faster than actions. While their phenomenological profile can at 
times be completely absent, behaviours typically involve the sub-
jective experience of ownership without agency, whereas the intro-
spective availability of goal-directedness varies and there frequently is 
a complete lack of meta-awareness. 
There are not only bodily actions, but also mental actions. 
Deliberately focusing one’s attention on a perceptual object or con-
sciously drawing a logical conclusion are examples of mental actions. 
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Just like physical actions, mental actions possess satisfaction con-
ditions (i.e. they are directed at a goal state). Although they mostly 
lack overt behavioural correlates, they can be intentionally inhibited, 
suspended, or terminated, just like bodily actions can. In addition, they 
are interestingly characterized by their temporally extended phenom-
enology of ownership, goal-directedness, a subjective sense of effort, 
and the concomitant conscious experience of agency and mental self-
control. 
Let me distinguish the two most important types of mental action: 
 Attentional agency (AA), the ability to control one’s focus of 
attention. 
 Cognitive agency (CA), the ability to control goal/task-related, 
deliberate thought. 
AA and CA are not only functional properties that are gradually 
acquired in childhood, can be lost in old age or due to brain lesions, 
and whose incidence, variance, robustness, etc. can be scientifically 
investigated. They also have a subjective side: attentional agency 
(Metzinger, 2003a, 6.4.3; 2006, Section 4) is also a phenomenal 
property, as is the case for pain or the subjective quality of ‘blueness’ 
in a visual colour experience (Metzinger, 1995). AA is the conscious 
experience of actually initiating a shift of attention, of controlling and 
fixing its focus on a certain aspect of reality. AA involves a sense of 
effort, and it is the phenomenal signature of our functional ability to 
actively influence what we will come to know, and what, for now, we 
will ignore. Consciously experienced AA is theoretically important, 
because it is probably the earliest and simplest form of experiencing 
oneself as a knowing self, as an epistemic agent. To consciously enjoy 
AA means that you (the cognitive system as a whole) currently 
identify with the content of a particular self-representation, an 
‘epistemic agent model’ (EAM; see Section 2 and Metzinger, 
2013a,b) currently active in your brain. AA is fully transparent:3 the 
                                                          
3  ‘Transparency’ is a property of conscious representations, namely, that they are not 
experienced as representations. Therefore, the subject of experience has the feeling of 
being in direct and immediate contact with their content. Transparent conscious repre-
sentations create the phenomenology of naïve realism. An opaque phenomenal repre-
sentation is one that is experienced as a representation, for example in pseudo-
hallucinations or lucid dreams. Importantly, a transparent self-model creates the 
phenomenology of identification (Section 3; Metzinger, 2003a; 2008). There exists a 
graded spectrum between transparency and opacity, determining the variable 
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content of your conscious experience is not one of self-representation 
or of an ongoing process of self-modelling, of depicting yourself as a 
causal agent in certain shifts of ‘zoom factor’, ‘resolving power’, or 
‘resource allocation’, and so on. Rather, you directly experience your-
self as, for example, actively selecting a new object for attention. 
During mind-wandering episodes we do not have AA, although these 
episodes can of course be about having been an attentional agent in 
the past, or about planning to control one’s attention in the future. 
Other examples of situations in which this property is selectively 
missing are non-lucid dreaming and NREM-sleep mentation 
(Metzinger, 2013b; Windt, 2015), but also infancy, dementia, or 
severe intoxication syndromes. 
An analogous point can be made for CA. Conceptually, cognitive 
agency is not only a complex set of functional abilities, like the 
capacity of mental calculation, consciously drawing logical conclu-
sions, engaging in rational, symbolic thought, and so on. Again, there 
is a distinct phenomenology of currently being a cognitive agent, 
which can lead to experiential self-reports like ‘I am a thinking self in 
the act of grasping a concept’, ‘I have just actively arrived at a specific 
conclusion’, etc. What AA and CA have in common is that in both 
cases we consciously represent ourselves as epistemic agents: accord-
ing to subjective experience, we are entities that actively construct and 
search for new epistemic relations to the world and ourselves. 
There are, however, not only mental actions, but also mental 
behaviours. ‘Mind-wandering’, or spontaneous, task-unrelated 
thought, is a paradigm example of unintentional mental behaviour. It 
may often be purposeful, but exhibits no conscious goal-representa-
tion, no overt behavioural correlates, it is characterized by an 
unnoticed loss of mental self-control and high degrees of automaticity, 
plus a lack of sensitivity to the situational context, while the 
phenomenological profile is characterized by ownership without 
agency, variable or absent introspective availability of goal-
directedness, and frequently by a complete lack of meta-awareness 
(Schooler et al., 2011). Empirically, it is plausible to assume that 
unconscious mind-wandering, instantiating no phenomenal properties 
whatsoever, exists as well (Horovitz et al., 2009; Pliushch and 
Metzinger, 2015; Samann et al., 2011; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). 
                                                                                                                  
phenomenology of ‘mind-independence’ or ‘realness’. Unconscious representations are 
neither transparent nor opaque. See Metzinger (2003b) for a concise introduction. 
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What we can consciously access as daydreaming, inner thoughts, 
fantasies, unbidden memories and feelings may rather be just the tip of 
the iceberg, a small partition of a much larger state space in which the 
continuous cognitive dynamics unfolds. Conscious mind-wandering 
would then be characterized by a higher degree of coherence, but still 
emerge out of a larger unconscious background of activity. Mind-
wandering and nocturnal dreaming (cf. Metzinger, 2013a,b; Fox et al., 
2013; Wamsley, 2013; Windt and Metzinger, 2007; Windt, 2015) are 
both interesting to philosophers of mind, because both involve sudden 
shifts in mechanisms of self-identification, rationality deficits, and a 
cyclically recurring decrease in mental autonomy that is not self-
initiated and frequently unnoticed. 
Some mental activities are not autonomously controllable, because 
one centrally important defining characteristic does not hold: they 
cannot be inhibited, suspended, or terminated. Let us call these 
activities ‘unintentional mental behaviours’. Mind-wandering can 
therefore be conceptualized as a form of unintentional behaviour, as 
an involuntary form of mental activity. Of course, the fact that a given 
behaviour, be it mental or bodily, is unintentional in no way implies 
that this behaviour is unintelligent or even maladaptive. For example, 
low-level, saliency-driven shifts in attentional focus are unintentional 
mental behaviours, and not inner actions. In standard situations, they 
cannot be inhibited. They are initiated by unconscious mechanisms, 
but may well result in a stable, perceptually coupled first-person per-
spective as their final stage. Stimulus-independent, task-independent 
thought, however, normally begins as a form of uncontrolled mental 
behaviour, a breakdown of consciously guided epistemic auto-
regulation, which is the active control of one’s own epistemic states at 
the level of high-level cognition. Just like an automatic, saliency-
driven shift in the focus of attention, it may be caused by unconscious 
factors like introspectively inaccessible goal representations that drive 
the high-level phenomenology of mind-wandering (Klinger, 2013), for 
example by representations of postponed goal-states which have been 
environmentally cued by goal-related stimuli under high cognitive 
load (Cohen, 2013; McVay and Kane, 2013). Both low-level attention 
and uncontrolled, automatic thinking will frequently count as intelli-
gent, an adaptive type of inner behaviour. But as long as it is going on, 
we seem to lack the ability to terminate or suspend it — we are fully 
immersed in an inner narrative and cannot deliberately ‘snap out of it’ 
(see below and note #9). Perhaps the most relevant and hitherto 
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neglected phenomenological constraint for a theory of mental 
autonomy is that, subjectively, we do not notice this fact. 
But what exactly is autonomy? Very generally speaking, autonomy 
would be the capacity for rational self-control, whereas the term 
‘mental autonomy’ refers to the specific ability to control one’s own 
mental functions, like attention, episodic memory, planning, concept 
formation, rational deliberation, or decision making, etc. Let us begin 
by looking at the contrast class of our target phenomenon, at cases 
where some of these functions would selectively operate without the 
decisive ability to wilfully terminate or suspend them. How can one 
better describe the missing element? As it turns out, the contrast class 
is very large. A second highly relevant fact that has been almost 
completely overlooked by philosophers, or so I will claim in Section 
3, is that a recurring loss of mental autonomy is one major 
characteristic of our cognitive phenomenology,4 and that both research 
on dreaming and mind-wandering have already developed important 
research tools to investigate this hitherto neglected aspect further (like 
external probing, or systematic questions after sleep lab awakenings; 
cf. Smallwood, 2013; Windt, 2015). However, in this case, empirical 
and conceptual questions are so deeply intertwined that we need a 
stronger form of cooperation between the disciplines. Therefore, what 
is now needed is a first set of conceptual instruments that opens the 
field for fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration. 
One way of providing a richer conceptual analysis of what a loss of 
mental autonomy actually amounts to is by describing it as losing the 
ability for second-order mental action. This ability can be decom-
posed into the following capacities: 
 The imposing of rules on one’s own mental behaviour; 
 explicit goal-selection, goal-commitment, goal-permanence; 
 satisfaction of rationality constraints or rational guidance; 
 intentional inhibition, suspension, or termination of an ongoing 
process. 
                                                          
4  ‘Cognitive phenomenology’ is a new subfield of research in philosophy of mind that 
focuses on the phenomenal character of occurrent non-sensory mental states like 
thoughts or wishes, and on the distinct subjective quality that goes along with thinking 
(see Bayne and Montague, 2011, for a good overview). Some philosophers claim that 
there is a proprietary, distinctive, and individuative phenomenology of higher cognitive 
processing that cannot be derived from sensory phenomenology, others deny this claim. 
For present purposes, I leave this controversial issue to the side (but see the point about 
predictive horizons in Section 3). 
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Let us introduce a working concept of ‘second-order mental action’. 
The satisfaction conditions of second-order mental actions are con-
stituted by successfully influencing other mental actions or mental 
behaviours, first-order mental processes are the targets of second-
order mental action. Examples of second-order mental action are the 
termination of an ongoing violent fantasy, but also the deliberate 
strengthening and sustaining of a spontaneously arising pleasant day-
dream, the effortful attempt to make an ongoing process of visual 
perception more precise by selectively controlling the focus of 
attention, or — as in mental calculation and logical thought — the 
process of imposing a very specific abstract structure on a temporal 
sequence of inner events, of ‘conducting’ a symbolic train of thought 
(McVay and Kane, 2009). Philosophically, it is interesting to note 
how second-order mental actions are essential tools for achieving 
higher degrees of mental autonomy and self-determination; and also 
how many of them can be described as processes of computational 
resource allocation in the brain — for example, in the case of 
attentional agency, as an active optimization of precision expectations 
(Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015). However, an important 
distinction is the difference between possessing an ability (for 
example, the ‘tool’ of second-order mental action) and having an 
explicit knowledge that oneself possesses this ability. What Schooler 
and colleagues have provisionally termed ‘meta-awareness’ (Schooler 
et al., 2011) is a necessary precondition for second-order mental 
action. 
We may treat the preceding discussion as a first set of empirical, 
phenomenological, and conceptual constraints that any good philo-
sophical theory should satisfy, and then ask: What exactly is 
autonomy at the mental level? First, because developmentally as well 
as phenomenologically AA clearly is the more basic form of epistemic 
mental agency, we need a subdoxastic account of autonomy here, one 
that does not presuppose rationality constraints, propositional atti-
tudes, or access to some Sellarsian or other kind of ‘logical space of 
reasons’. Please recall how, above, I already pointed out that con-
sciously experienced AA is theoretically important, because it is 
probably the earliest and simplest form of experiencing oneself as an 
autonomous epistemic agent. A second point of interest is that, at least 
in human beings, it not only causally enables high-level rational 
thought, but helps to constitute it: AA can exist without CA, but it is a 
necessary condition for CA. If we cannot control our attention, we 
cannot engage in rational, logically structured thought, but on the 
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other hand there are many self-conscious biological systems that, 
while not having the capacity for high-level rationality, can actively 
control and even become the object of their own attention (think of 
mirror-self-recognition in chimpanzees, bottlenose dolphins, or the 
Eurasian magpie). Second, we want a working concept of M-
autonomy that facilitates interdisciplinary cooperation by being open 
to fine-grained functional analysis, yielding testable empirical pre-
dictions (e.g. the existence of a ‘self-representational blink’ following 
every single loss of autonomy, see Metzinger, 2013a). 
‘Veto control’, or the capacity for intentional inhibition, may have 
to be the central semantic element in our new working concept of M-
autonomy — simply because if you cannot terminate your very own 
activity, then you cannot be said to be autonomous in any interesting 
sense. This element can be empirically grounded, gradually refined, 
and may prove heuristically fruitful in guiding future research. Veto 
control is a manifestation of the capacity to voluntarily suspend or 
inhibit an action, and from a logical point of view it is a functional 
property which we do not ascribe to the brain, but to the person as a 
whole. Let us call the capacity in question ‘intentional inhibition’.5 
During a mind-wandering episode, we do not have this capacity, 
because we cannot actively suspend or inhibit our own mental 
activity. Recent empirical work reveals the dorsal fronto-median 
cortex (dFMC) as a candidate region for the physical realization of 
this very special form of purely mental second-order action.6 It does 
not overlap with known networks for external inhibition, and its 
computational function may lie in predicting the social and more long-
term individual consequences of a currently unfolding action, that is, 
in representing the action’s socially and temporally more distant 
implications for the organism.7 There is a considerable amount of 
valuable neurobiological data on the physical substrates of intentional 
inhibition in human beings, and a number of them have already led to 
more abstract computational models of volitional control, action 
                                                          
5  In adopting this terminological convention, I follow Marcel Brass (Brass and Haggard, 
(2007); an excellent and helpful recent review is Filevich, Kühn and Haggard (2012). 
6  See Kühn, Haggard and Brass (2009), Brass and Haggard (2007), Campbell-Meiklejohn 
et al. (2008). A helpful recent review of negative motor effects following direct cortical 
stimulation, listing the main sites of arrest responses and offering interesting discussion 
is Filevich, Kühn and Haggard (2012). 
7  This passage draws on Metzinger (2013a). See also Filevich, Kühn and Haggard (2012; 
2013). 
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selection, and intention inhibition itself (Filevich, Kühn and Haggard, 
2012; 2013; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008; Kühn, Haggard and 
Brass, 2009; Brass and Haggard, 2007). These data are valuable not 
only for understanding the ‘back end’ of many mind-wandering 
episodes, but also for a more comprehensive theory of mental 
autonomy (for more, see Metzinger 2013a, Section 3.3). 
Conceptually, many forms of mental self-control — like AA — pre-
suppose exactly this ability for veto control, but are not directly 
guided by consciously represented reasons, explicit logical inferences, 
or arguments. Indeed, there is no need or even conceptual necessity to 
specify autonomy as rational self-control, because our capacity for 
rational self-control is only a special case of a more comprehensive, 
fundamental set of functional properties. First, rationality does not 
have to express itself in terms of explicit, symbolic reasoning pro-
cesses using propositional data-formats (e.g. a Fodorian ‘language of 
thought’), but can be operationally defined as a property of some 
global input-output-function maximizing a specific fitness criterion. 
Second, there are more operational and empirically grounded models 
of autonomy, combining the notion of causal self-determination with 
independence from alternative causes, both inner and outer (see Seth, 
2010, for the notion of ‘G-autonomy’ based on a formal analysis of 
Granger causality). For empirical research programmes on mind-
wandering, such operational concepts are more likely to yield specific, 
testable hypotheses. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘rational mental self-
control’ in the traditional sense remains important if we want to 
understand the phenomenology of high-level cognition and the norma-
tive components of our concept of ‘personhood’. Explicit rational self-
control at the mental level cannot be reduced to veto control — on the 
contrary, the capacity for veto autonomy is only one of its centrally 
relevant constitutive conditions. Clearly, the capacity for inhibiting 
mental processes via second-order acts of vetoing without the involve-
ment of quasi-conceptual or quasi-propositional representations is the 
more frequent and also more basic phenomenon, and hence also the 
more fundamentally relevant target for research. You can only be 
rational if you have the capacity for mental veto control, but you can 
achieve a high degree of mental autonomy without rational self-
control. 
This yields a working concept of M-autonomy as the ability to con-
trol the conscious contents of one’s mind in a goal-directed way, by 
means of attentional or cognitive agency. This ability can be a form of 
rational self-control, which is based on reasons, beliefs, and con-
 280 T.  METZINGER 
 
ceptual thought, but it does not have to be. What is crucial is the ‘veto 
component’: being mentally autonomous means that all currently 
ongoing processes can in principle be suspended or terminated. 
Importantly, this does not mean that they actually are terminated, it 
just means that the ability, the functional potential, is given and that 
the person has knowledge of this fact. This point provides us with a 
third and equally important phenomenological constraint: if we only 
‘tune out’, but do not ‘zone out’ — for example if we observe the 
spontaneous arising of memories or the beginning stages of a day-
dream, or if we even voluntarily indulge in a fantasy while all the time 
knowing that we could terminate this inner activity at any instant — 
then we possess M-autonomy (see note #9). Call this the principle of 
‘Autonomy by Phenomenal Self-Representation’: one can only 
deliberately and autonomously exert an ability if that ability is 
explicitly represented in one’s phenomenal self-model. Terminating a 
train of thought is one example of such an ability, detaching the focus 
of attention from a perceptual object is another. In sum, M-autonomy 
is the capacity for causal self-determination at the mental level. It is 
based on a complex and graded functional property, which comes in 
three major degrees: the phenomenally represented knowledge that 
oneself currently possesses this specific ability, executed attentional 
self-control, and cognitive self-control. 
2. M-Autonomy, the First-Person 
Perspective, and Personhood 
For a human being, to possess a consciously experienced first-person 
perspective means to have acquired a very specific functional profile 
and a distinctive level of representational content in one’s currently 
active phenomenal self-model: it has, episodically, become a dynamic 
inner model of a knowing self. Representing facts under such a model 
creates a new epistemic modality. All knowledge is now accessed 
under a new internal mode of presentation, namely, as knowledge 
possessed by a self-conscious entity intentionally directed at the 
world. Therefore, it is subjective knowledge. This notion of a con-
scious model of oneself as an individual entity actively trying to estab-
lish epistemic relations to the world and to oneself, I think, comes 
very close to what we traditionally mean by notions like ‘subjectivity’ 
or ‘possession of a first-person perspective’. If we combine this 
observation with the concept of M-autonomy, then we can perhaps 
gain a fresh, empirically grounded, and conceptually enriched 
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perspective on traditional philosophical puzzles related to concepts 
like ‘perspectivalness’ and ‘personhood’. 
Let us introduce a second conceptual instrument. The concept of an 
‘epistemic agent model’, or EAM, refers to a specific type of con-
scious self-representation, a small subset of phenomenal self-models 
(PSMs).8 This simply means that, at the level of conscious experience, 
the self is represented as something that either currently stands in an 
epistemic relation to the world, in the relation of knowing, thinking, 
actively guiding attention, or actively trying to understand what is 
going on in its environment; or, more abstractly, as an entity that has 
the ability to do so.9 For any information processing system, to 
possess a first-person perspective means to operate under a specific 
kind of conscious self-representation, a PSM that portrays the system 
as an epistemic agent, as an entity that is actively searching for and 
optimizing its knowledge, for example by controlling its own high-
level, quasi-symbolic processing as a cognitive agent (CA) or by 
actively sustaining and controlling the focus of attention (AA). This is 
what I call an EAM.10 Again, having an EAM is a special case of 
                                                          
8  A useful conceptual instrument to develop more fine-grained descriptions of the 
phenomenology of mind-wandering and the episodic reappearance of M-autonomy is 
the notion of a ‘phenomenal self-model’ (PSM; Metzinger, 2003a; 2006; 2008). A PSM 
is a conscious representation of the system as a whole, including not only global body 
representation (Metzinger, 2014; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009), but also psychological, 
social, and other potential personal-level properties. One central idea of the self-model 
theory (Metzinger, 2003a) is that, under standard conditions, a large part of the human 
PSM is ‘transparent’, because we are not able to experience it as a model and therefore 
fully identify with its representational content. Having an EAM is a special case of 
having a PSM. 
9  This is not to say that we never purposefully engage in daydreams or that there are 
never situations in which we are mind-wandering while being passively aware of this 
fact. This is only to say that intentional episodes of daydreaming, to the extent that they 
do involve the phenomenology of AA and CA, thereby do not count as episodes of 
mind-wandering, which refer only to unintentional episodes of stimulus-independent 
thought. One advantage of the terminological solution proposed here is exactly that it 
enables a continuous description of real-world cases: as long as the EAM still represents 
the ability to become an active attentional or cognitive agent, we have M-autonomy. 
What has been termed ‘zoning out’ (unaware mind-wandering) and ‘tuning out’ (mind-
wandering with awareness) in the empirical literature (Smallwood, McSpadden and 
Schooler, 2007, p. 524; 2008; Schooler et al., 2011, p. 323) can be nicely captured by 
this conceptual distinction. 
10  For details, see Metzinger (2003a, and 2006, Section 4). The philosophical notion of a 
‘phenomenal model of the intentionality relation’ (PMIR) is directly related to the idea 
of dynamically integrating top-down control (e.g. by the fronto-parietal control net-
work) with subpersonal, bottom-up components (e.g. a subset of activity in the default 
mode network) by creating an internal model of the whole organism as currently being 
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having a PSM, not all PSMs are EAMs. Empirically, it has been 
shown that human beings can enjoy a minimal form of self-
consciousness without possessing an EAM (Blanke and Metzinger, 
2009; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013). The transition from 
simple, bodily self-identification to the relevant, stronger form takes 
place when a system phenomenally represents itself as an entity 
capable of epistemic agency, or even as one currently exerting 
epistemic agency. If such a specific kind of self-model is in place, 
ongoing processes can be embedded into it, thereby creating the 
phenomenology of ownership (my thought, my own autobiographical 
memory, my own future planning). If these processes are additionally 
represented as control processes, as successful acts of exerting causal 
influence, they can now be consciously experienced as processes of 
self-control or instances of successful mental self-determination. An 
EAM is an instrument in what one might call ‘epistemic autoregula-
tion’: it helps a self-conscious system in selecting and determining 
what it will know, and what it will not know. Yet, an epistemic agent 
model of this kind is not a little man in the head, but itself an entirely 
subpersonal process. During full-blown episodes of mind-wandering, 
we are not epistemic agents, neither as controllers of attentional focus 
nor as deliberate thinkers of thoughts, and we have forgotten about our 
agentive abilities. A first interim conclusion then is that what really 
takes place at the onset of a mind-wandering episode must be a 
collapse of the EAM. 
It would perhaps be tempting to say that during such periods we 
have altogether lost the functional ability to control our own thought. I 
want to defend a more moderate, nuanced position: what we have lost 
is a specific form of knowledge, and not the ability itself, namely, 
conscious knowledge of our potential for second-order mental action. 
We are still persons, because we have the relevant potential. But we 
currently lack an explicit and globally available representation of an 
existing functional ability for active epistemic self-control — because 
we have not epistemically appropriated it. And that is exactly what an 
EAM does for us. But why do we then have the feeling that all of this 
cannot be an accurate phenomenological description of a very large 
portion of our conscious lives? Because we confuse our abstract, 
                                                                                                                  
directed at an object component, for example, by means of a well-ordered train of 
thought; see Smallwood et al. (2012). The PMIR would then be the conscious correlate 
of this process, the phenomenal experience of what was termed CA in the main text. 
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retrospective, and purely intellectual knowledge that, in principle, we 
had the critical mental ability all along with what actually was the case 
on the level of concrete, inner phenomenology: the absence of an 
EAM. As Franz Brentano (1874/1973, pp. 165f.) and much later 
Daniel Dennett (1991, p. 359) have pointed out, the representation of 
absence is not the same as the absence of representation. 
It follows that in most cases the re-emergence of an EAM will have 
to be caused by an unconscious event, perhaps by chance, perhaps 
based on an implicit knowledge about the relevant potential, about an 
already existing ability. Whenever the dynamic process of creating 
and sustaining an EAM takes place, we also have a first-person per-
spective. AA is one specific example of having a consciously experi-
enced first-person perspective. Its theoretical relevance consists in the 
fact that it is plausibly the simplest form of an EAM human beings 
can have. We still lack an empirically grounded theory of subjectivity, 
a model of the first-person perspective as a naturally evolved 
phenomenon (Metzinger, 2003a). But it is clear that having a first-
person perspective is not a unitary but a graded phenomenon, and 
research on mind-wandering can make decisive contributions by 
functionally dissociating different levels. For example, we can see 
more clearly how attentional control is a necessary condition of 
personhood: you cannot engage in rational thought if you cannot 
control your own attention, because high-level epistemic autoregu-
lation functionally presupposes low-level epistemic autoregulation. 
Originally, the concept of a ‘first-person perspective’ is not much 
more than a visuo-grammatical metaphor. It has two different 
semantic components: the specific logic of the self-ascription of 
psychological properties using the first-person pronoun ‘I’, and the 
entirely contingent spatial geometry of our dominant sensory 
modality. Conscious vision of the human kind has a ‘perspectival’ 
geometrical structure, because it involves a single point of origin, 
namely, behind our eyes as phenomenally experienced. On a more 
abstract level, we may connect this phenomenological notion of an 
‘origin’ constituting the centre of our internal model of reality with the 
origin of multimodal perceptual space (‘here’), with self-location in a 
temporal order (‘now’), and with the sensorimotor origins of action 
space, i.e. with the physical body (‘embodiment’). Arguably, however, 
all of this only leads to a more or less minimal sense of selfhood (see 
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009), in which the subjectivity and per-
spectivalness of experience are mostly captured in an implicit or 
spatial sense. I think the concept of an EAM is interesting for any non-
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trivial notion of subjectivity, because it isolates the origin of our inner 
space of action. 
What about personhood? Clearly, an animal or artificial cognitive 
system could have a first-person perspective in this sense without 
counting as a person. On the other hand the potential for M-autonomy 
and the functional ability to (at least sometimes) operate under a con-
scious EAM are excellent candidates for criteria of personhood, which 
have the advantage of empirical grounding and hardware-independ-
ence at the same time. For the purposes of this paper, let us say that 
‘personhood’ is a concept of social ontology. Personhood is consti-
tuted not in brains, but in societies — via a process in which human 
beings acknowledge each other as rational individuals possessing the 
capacity for moral thought and action. This makes the two concepts of 
M-autonomy and an EAM even more interesting: they potentially 
allow us to describe not only necessary conditions of personhood, but 
also the transition to personhood in a more fine-grained way. Human 
beings only become persons exactly by having the potential to 
phenomenologically identify with the content of an EAM, a step 
which on the sociocultural level causally enables relevant practices 
like linguistically ascribing person-status to themselves and mutually 
acknowledging each other as subjects of experience, as epistemic 
agents, and as morally sensitive, rational individuals. This led to a 
major expansion of our culturally structured cognitive niche and 
enabled the evolution of new forms of intelligence via a mutual 
scaffolding between all those individuals immersed in it. But why do 
we subjectively experience some of our cognitive processes as 
personal-level properties? There is a long story to be told here 
(Metzinger, 2003a; 2006; 2007; 2008), but the short answer is this: 
because they have been embedded into an EAM, which is currently 
active in our brain; and because we live in a normative sociocultural 
context in which we are now able to folk-psychologically describe and 
reciprocally acknowledge each other as rational individuals — a fact 
which then in turn influences introspective experience itself, turning 
the self-model into a person-model. From a functional perspective, M-
autonomy dramatically expands our inner and outer space of possible 
behaviours, and one may speculate that perhaps it was exactly the 
emergence of an EAM which causally triggered the transition from 
biological to cultural evolution in our ancestors. 
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3. Conscious Thought is a Subpersonal Process 
Before I present a simple, quantitative argument for the main claim of 
this paper, please follow me in considering an introductory example. It 
may help to further clarify and illustrate what has been said above. 
Imagine you are participating in a Buddhist-style silent retreat, an 
intensive course in mindfulness meditation. During the first three days 
your teacher instructs you to very precisely observe your breath as it 
comes and goes, but without in any way interfering with the respira-
tory process itself. Your task is to, whenever you have noticed an 
incoming thought or any other sort of distraction, gently bring back 
your attention to the bodily sensations going along with the rise and 
fall of your chest or abdomen, and to the sensation of the breath at the 
nostrils and the internal flow of air. Whenever you notice another 
attentional lapse, you simply return to your breath. But later, as the 
retreat progresses, you are instructed to become non-judgmentally 
aware of those incoming thoughts themselves, as they come and go, 
not identifying with or reacting to them. Now your task is to simply be 
present with whatever arises in your conscious mind. 
We have two different tasks, and, at least initially, two different 
kinds of mental action, leading to two different inner situations. Given 
these two situations — what exactly is it that you are phenomenally 
representing? Let us ask: what is your conscious experience an experi-
ence of? I claim that in both cases you are representing physical pro-
cesses in the body, you are experiencing not actions, but events, 
namely, chains of subpersonal events. The properties instantiated 
during these processes are not properties of the person as a whole. Let 
us first look at the intentional object of your introspective experience 
from a metaphysical perspective. 
From the perspective of metaphysics, to gain meta-awareness of 
ongoing mind-wandering really is almost exactly like gaining meta-
awareness of your breath. The introspective experience of breathing, 
as well as seemingly task-unrelated, phenomenologically spontaneous 
thoughts, are not personal-level psychological processes that are 
mysteriously correlated with or caused by some physical chain of 
events. The most parsimonious metaphysical interpretation of the 
relevant scientific data is that they are identical with functionally 
complex, but sub-global physiological processes in the biological 
body. In the case of mind-wandering, this physiological process is a 
specific, widely distributed pattern of neural activity, and it is now 
empirically plausible to assume that large parts of this pattern overlap 
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with activity in the default mode network (DMN; Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna and Schacter, 2008; Christoff, 2012, Christoff et al., 2009; 
Weissman et al., 2006; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2010; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; 
Mason et al., 2007; Spreng, Mar and Kim, 2009), but that it also 
extends to other functional structures like the rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula, temporopolar cortex, 
secondary somatosensory cortex, and lingual gyrus (for a recent meta-
analysis, see Fox et al., 2015). What we introspectively represent are 
specific, as yet unknown abstract properties of the physical dynamics 
characterizing this pattern. 
‘Sub-global’ or ‘local’, however, does not automatically imply ‘sub-
personal’. A sub-global physiological process in the brain can become 
a personal-level process by being functionally integrated and repre-
sented within an EAM. Conversely, simply being identical with a 
‘global’ process in the brain does not automatically imply being 
attributable to the person as a whole. What is required for the relevant 
shift from the subpersonal to the personal level is an epistemic appro-
priation at a specific level of phenomenal self-consciousness, the 
functional integration into an EAM (as explained in Section 2). The 
wandering mind does not meet this criterion, it is therefore sub-global 
and subpersonal. As the brain is a part of our body, any rational 
research heuristics targeting the neural correlates for the introspective 
phenomenology of breathing, or alternatively the critical subset of 
neural activity underlying mind-wandering, will therefore treat them 
as subpersonal, bodily processes. They have a long evolutionary 
history (Corballis, 2013; Lu et al., 2012; Mantini and Vanduffel, 
2012), and both of them clearly are constituted by dynamic, self-
organizing chains of neural events that continuously and automatically 
unfold over time. They are not agentive processes implying explicit 
goal-selection, rationality constraints, etc. The postulation of a local, 
domain-specific identity is a tenable, coherent metaphysical inter-
pretation of this fact. Whatever will figure as the explanans in a future 
scientific theory of mind-wandering or the phenomenology of 
breathing will therefore not be global properties of ‘the mind’ or the 
person as a whole, but specific microfunctional properties realized by 
the local physical dynamics underlying each episode of consciously 
experienced subpersonal cognitive processing. Therefore, if one adds 
the straightforward metaphysical assumption of a domain-specific 
identity (Bickle, 2013; McCauley and Bechtel, 2001) holding between 
the phenomenal states constituting episodes of mind-wandering and 
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what we are currently beginning to discover and incrementally isolate 
as their local, minimally sufficient neural ‘correlates’ (NCCs; e.g. 
Chalmers, 2000), then it seems obvious that mind-wandering simply is 
the phenomenal awareness of a local bodily process. What the 
Buddhist meditator attends to is activity in the NCC for mind-
wandering, the dynamics of a local physical process. 
But what then explains the marked phenomenological difference 
between those two different inner situations? On a more abstract, 
representationalist level of description we would say that attention has 
been directed to two different content levels in the conscious self-
model, to certain aspects of the body-model and to the internal 
dynamics of the cognitive self-model. The crucial difference between 
the phenomenological profile of mindfully observing the breath and 
that of ‘being present with whatever arises in the mind’ can now be 
explained by the fact that only in the first case we find the functional 
property of information being made globally available through an 
interoceptive receptor system. Therefore, what Buddhists call 
‘Anapanasati’ (or mindfulness of breathing) generates a sensory 
phenomenology of bodily self-representation. By contrast, as the 
human brain is devoid of any self-directed sensory channels or 
receptor systems, the relevant subset of neural activity in the NCC for 
mind-wandering cannot be informationally accessed through any 
perception-like causal links — although it, too, is a bodily process. 
Consequently, the phenomenology of cognition must necessarily be a 
non-sensory phenomenology — although it can of course be about 
possible sensory perceptions, fantasy worlds, linked to motor simula-
tions, affectively toned, etc. 
Put differently, what the cognitive self-model continuously predicts 
(Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015) are just much more 
abstract aspects of reality, in a wider temporal frame of reference, and 
not ongoing events on the sensory sheet. The PSM can be seen as an 
integrated global hypothesis about the state of the system in which it 
appears, constituted by a large number of individual predictions or 
sub-hypotheses, which are hierarchically structured and optimized at 
different timescales. A conscious self-model is therefore composed of 
different layers of expectations, in a continuous attempt of minimizing 
uncertainty and prediction error related to the system itself. Some 
layers continuously target causal regularities in shorter time-windows, 
some extract regularities relative to larger time-windows. In the words 
of Jakob Hohwy: 
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…the difference between percepts and concepts comes out in terms of a 
gradual movement from variance to invariance, via spatiotemporal 
scales of causal regularities. There is thus no categorical difference 
between them; percepts are maintained in detail-rich internal models 
with a short prediction horizon and concepts in more detail-poor models 
with longer prediction horizons. (Hohwy, 2013, p. 72) 
What, then, determines the two different introspective phenomenol-
ogies of breathing and thinking? First, there will necessarily be 
different internal data-formats corresponding to either direct per-
ceptual coupling sustained by receptor-driven input or to its absence, 
as we are clearly dealing with very different hierarchical levels in the 
self-model. Second, the different prediction horizons functionally 
characterizing these levels will lead to an embodied, fully situated, 
and perceptually coupled sense of presence in the first case, and to an 
‘unextended’, much more disembodied (and potentially ‘absent-
minded’) phenomenology in which the temporal succession of inner 
events is more salient, while at the same time spatial qualities as well 
their deep sensorimotor origins have become almost unnoticeable. 
With regard to these more abstract content-layers of the human self-
model, the facts that philosophers have frequently overlooked are, 
first, that non-agentive cognitive phenomenology is much more wide-
spread than intuitively assumed, and second, that, conceptually, it 
often is not a personal-level process at all. 
Before presenting some empirical evidence, let us remain with the 
illustrative example of mindfulness meditation to see a second, 
equally relevant, point more clearly. It is not about the metaphysics, 
but about the epistemology of conscious self-knowledge. One 
advantage of the concept of ‘M-autonomy’ is that it also offers a new 
understanding of what classical mindfulness meditation is: it is a 
systematic and formal mental practice of cultivating M-autonomy. 
Because mindfulness and mind-wandering are opposing constructs 
(Mrazek, Smallwood and Schooler, 2012), the process of losing and 
regaining meta-awareness can be most closely studied in different 
stages of classical mindfulness meditation (Hölzel et al., 2011; 
Slagter, Davidson and Lutz, 2011). In the early stages of object-
orientated meditation, there will typically be cyclically recurring 
losses of M-autonomy (see Hasenkamp et al., 2012, fig. 1; Metzinger, 
2013a), plus an equally recurring second-order mental action, namely 
the decision to gently but firmly bring the focus of attention back to 
the formal object of meditation, for example to interoceptive sensa-
tions associated with the respiratory process. Here, the 
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phenomenology will often be one of mental agency, goal-directedness, 
and a mild sense of effort. In advanced stages of so-called ‘open 
monitoring’ meditation, however, the aperture of attention has 
gradually widened, typically resulting in an effortless and choiceless 
awareness of the present moment as a whole. Whereas in beginning 
stages of object-orientated mindfulness practice the meditator 
identifies with an internal model of a mental agent directed at a certain 
goal-state (‘the meditative self’), meta-awareness of the second kind is 
typically described as having an effortless and non-agentive quality. In 
the first case an EAM is present, leading to a process that would still 
count as personal-level, whereas in the second case we have meta-
awareness without an EAM. It is important to understand that these 
are distinct phenomenological state-classes. Interestingly, even the 
neural correlates pertaining to this difference between ‘trying to medi-
tate’ and ‘meditation effortlessly taking place’ are already beginning 
to emerge (Garrison et al., 2013). 
From an epistemological point of view it is now interesting to note 
how the conceptual distinction between AA and CA either as 
functional or as phenomenal properties allows for the possibility of 
hallucinating epistemic agency. We might experience ourselves as 
autonomous mental subjects, but in some cases this might be an 
adaptive form of self-deception or confabulation (Hippel and Trivers, 
2011; Pliushch and Metzinger, 2015). For example, if a subject during 
an experimental design involving mindfulness-based stress reduction 
regains meta-awareness (Hölzel et al., 2011; Mrazek, Smallwood and 
Schooler, 2012) and describes the experience as ‘I have just realized 
that I was daydreaming and redirected my attention to the current 
moment and the physical sensations caused by the process of 
breathing!’, it may be false to assume that, functionally, the ‘realiza-
tion’ was actually a form of AA or CA (see Schooler et al., 2011, and 
Metzinger, 2013a, Section 3.3). What is subjectively described or 
experienced as a form of second-order mental action may sometimes 
not be a personal-level event at all, but a shift in the subpersonal self-
model that is then misdescribed on the level of self-report, an auto-
phenomenological post hoc-confabulation.11 To consciously represent 
                                                          
11  Let me point to a structural commonality with well-known problems in dream research, 
which may shed further light on the issue of what exactly it means that a mind-
wandering episode ends. First, there is the phenomenon of ‘false awakening’, that is of 
realistic dreams of waking up (Windt, 2015; Windt and Metzinger, 2007; Green, 1994); 
second, current research interestingly shows that there are different levels of stages of 
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oneself as just having exerted a certain mental ability does not mean 
that one actually had this ability; the phenomenology of M-autonomy 
does not justify the claim that the functional property of M-autonomy 
was actually present. Claiming so would be a category mistake in 
which epistemic properties are ascribed to something that does not 
intrinsically possess them (Metzinger and Windt, 2014, p. 287; 2015, 
p. 7). 
Regaining M-autonomy — a functional transition that in healthy 
people probably takes place many hundred times every day — seems 
to be a form of mental self-constitution, because a new type of con-
scious self-model is created, an EAM, which may later change global 
properties of the system as a whole (e.g. turning it into a subject of 
experience, or being recognized as a rational individual by other cog-
nitive systems). You can certainly own the thoughts generated by a 
wandering mind without an EAM (phenomenologically they are still 
yours) even if the knowledge that you have the causal capacity for 
self-control is not consciously available, not represented on the level 
of your PSM. But representing yourself as a cognitive agent leads to 
the instantiation of a new phenomenal property. Let us call it 
‘epistemic self-causation’: according to subjective experience — at 
the very moment of ‘coming to’ as it were — you actively constitute 
yourself as a thinker of thoughts. You are now consciously repre-
senting yourself as currently representing, as an individual entity 
creating new states of itself that are not just ‘real’ or bodily states, but 
states that might be true or false. You have intentional properties. As I 
have said in earlier work, having a first-person perspective means to 
dynamically co-represent the intentional relation itself while you 
represent, to operate under a model of reality containing the ‘arrow of 
intentionality’, which includes a conscious model of the self as 
directed at the world. The conscious experience of epistemic self-
causation would then be a result of exactly such a continuous process 
of dynamical self-organization, a non-agentive process leading to a 
new functional level in the PSM. Importantly, this also suggests that 
rationalizing the immediately preceding, earlier episode as having 
been under one’s control may be a functionally necessary way of re-
                                                                                                                  
becoming lucid in a dream (Noreika et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2013; Metzinger, 2013b). 
If there is an additional awareness of meta-awareness as just having been regained (i.e. a 
third-order meta-representation or second-order EAM), then the point made in the 
previous paragraph also applies: as such, this is just phenomenal experience, and not 
necessarily knowledge — we might always be introspectively self-deceived. 
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establishing and preserving internal coherence of the new conscious 
self-model, even if this process involves a retrospective confabulation. 
Leading empirical researchers come to the same conclusion. 
Schooler and colleagues, referring to work by the late Daniel Wegner, 
point out that regaining meta-awareness may be accompanied by an 
illusion of control (Schooler et al., 2011, Box 1; Wegner, 2002). 
Whenever we have this case, it seems that a specific new self-model 
has appeared: an autobiographical self-representation falsely depicting 
the last mental event as something that was self-controlled, an 
instance of deliberate causal self-determination at the mental level. 
This form of control is often described as an auto-epistemic form of 
self-control, as an instance of actively acquired self-knowledge or a 
sudden insight. Thus, a typical auto-phenomenological report may 
claim ‘I have just regained meta-awareness, because I just intro-
spectively realized that I was lost in mind-wandering!’. Do we have 
reason to believe such claims? Is the reappearance of meta-awareness 
a subpersonal event or is it something in which global control and the 
conscious EAM actually played a decisive causal role? 
Here, my positive proposal would be that we may actually be con-
fronted with a functionally adequate form of self-deception, at least in 
many such cases: the re-emergence of an EAM, really triggered by 
unconscious events, may necessarily involve a confabulatory element 
(‘I generated this insight myself!’) in order to ensure the coherence of 
the autobiographical self-model over time. In order to be able to con-
ceive of myself as an autonomous mental agent again, I simply must 
have been a mental agent in the preceding conscious moment too, 
because I had the ability, the potential, all the time. The transition 
must have been self-caused, because a ‘representational bridge’ has to 
be built to earlier instances of M-autonomy, thereby preserving the 
(virtual) transtemporal identity of the conscious, thinking self. I 
cannot consciously simulate myself as having unconsciously known 
about my ability for epistemic agency in the past. The onset of every 
fresh period of M-autonomous cognition may therefore, necessarily, 
involve an element of misrepresentation: if I want to consciously 
represent myself as just now having acquired the capability of causal 
self-determination, I need to integrate the (subpersonal) event of 
transition into the currently active PSM, endowing it with the 
phenomenal property of ownership and connecting it with earlier such 
events. If this is true, an illusory phenomenology of self-causation will 
be a necessary neurocomputational fiction in the construction of any 
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new EAM, terminating the mind-wandering episode which preceded 
it. 
The onset of a mind-wandering episode, on the other hand, can be 
understood as a loss of M-autonomy, because it involves an unnoticed 
loss of mental self-control and epistemic agency, either on the level of 
attention or of cognition. As an unintentional form of mental 
behaviour it is not rationally guided, and while it is unfolding it cannot 
be terminated at will. Mind-wandering is a failure of causal self-
determination at the level of mental content, and although it clearly 
has aspects that can be described as functionally adaptive, its overall 
performance costs and its negative effects on general, subjective well-
being are obvious and have been well documented (for example, in 
terms of reading comprehension, memory, sustained attention, or 
working memory, cf. Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013, Table 1). It is 
an important and philosophically relevant contribution of research on 
mind-wandering to have demonstrated the ubiquity of the 
phenomenon and its effects (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). 
Let us therefore look at some empirical constraints, which any con-
vincing philosophical theory of what, today, we still call ‘conscious 
thought’ must satisfy. We know that conscious mind-wandering is a 
process that can get completely out of control (Schupak and 
Rosenthal, 2009; Bigelsen and Schupak, 2011), but that can also come 
completely to rest, either in practitioners of mindfulness meditation 
(Mrazek, Smallwood and Schooler, 2012; Slagter, Davidson and Lutz, 
2011) or following lesions to the medial frontal cortex (Damasio and 
van Hoesen, 1983). Under normal conditions, we spend 30–50% of 
our conscious waking lives mind-wandering (Kane et al., 2007; 
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Schooler et al., 2011). During these 
times we do not possess M-autonomy. If we assume a 16-hour day 
period, 40% of waking mind-wandering would amount to an average 
of 384 minutes, a period during which we are not autonomous mental 
subjects. NREM-sleep mentation and non-lucid dreaming clearly are 
also periods during which the functional property of M-autonomy is 
absent, although complex cognitive processes are taking place across 
all sleep stages (Windt, 2014; Wamsley, 2013; Fox et al., 2013; 
Nielsen, 2000; Fosse, Stickgold and Hobson, 2001). They can be 
sampled and statistically evaluated, for example using a serial 
awakening paradigm (Noreika et al., 2009; Siclari et al., 2013). 
Although great progress has recently been made in isolating the neural 
correlates of dream lucidity (Dresler et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2009) 
and developing a more fine-grained conceptual taxonomy for different 
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kinds of lucidity (Noreika et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2013; Voss and 
Hobson, 2015), it remains clear that M-autonomy during the dream 
state is a very rare, and therefore negligible, phenomenon. 
Adults spend approximately 1.5 to 2 hours per night in REM sleep 
(Hobson, 2002, pp. 77–79f.). NREM sleep yields similar reports 
during stage 1, other stages of NREM sleep are characterized by more 
purely cognitive/symbolic mentation. Clearly conscious thought 
during NREM sleep also lacks M-autonomy, because it is mostly con-
fused, non-progressive, and perseverative. Whereas 81.9% of awaken-
ings from REM sleep yield mentation reports, the incidence of reports 
following NREM awakenings lies at only 43% percent (Nielsen, 2000, 
p. 855). If we assume an average REM-time of 105 minutes, there will 
be an average of 86 minutes characterized by phenomenally repre-
sented, but subpersonal cognitive processing; 375 minutes of NREM 
sleep will yield roughly 161 minutes of conscious mentation, again, 
without M-autonomy. Assuming a waking period of 960 minutes, a 
very rough, first-order approximation is that human beings enjoy one 
sort of phenomenology or another for about 20 hours a day (1207 
minutes; or about 84% of their daytime). 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of conscious experience over the 24-hour-cycle. 
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However, healthy adults are only M-autonomous for 9.6 hours (576 
minutes; or 40% of an average day). These are very conservative esti-
mates. For example, they also exclude lifetime periods of illness, 
intoxication, or anaesthesia. In addition, there is evidence for extended 
periods in which human beings lose M-autonomy altogether. These 
episodes may often not be remembered and also frequently escape 
detection by external observers, as in ‘mind-blanking’ (Ward and 
Wegner, 2013). The same may also be true of periods of insomnia, in 
which people are plagued by intrusive thoughts, feelings of regret, 
shame, and guilt while suffering from dysfunctional forms of cog-
nitive control, such as thought suppression, worry, depressive rumina-
tion, and counterfactual imagery (Schmidt, Harvey and van der 
Linden, 2011; Schmidt and van der Linden, 2009; Gay, Schmidt and 
van der Linden, 2011). We do not know when and how children 
actually acquire the necessary changes in their conscious self-model 
(Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013), but we may certainly add the 
empirically plausible assumption that children only gradually acquire 




Figure 2. Distribution of M-autonomy over the 24-hour-cycle. 
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The first conclusion to be drawn from this first-order approximation is 
that, according to our preliminary working concept of M-autonomy, 
human beings, although phenomenally conscious, are not autonomous 
mental subjects for roughly two thirds of their conscious lifetime. A 
second, related conclusion is that conscious thought primarily and 
predominantly is an automatic subpersonal process, like respiration, 
heartbeat, or immune autoregulation — and that, at the conceptual 
level, we should do justice to this fact. It is empirically plausible to 
assume that a considerable part of our own cognitive phenomenology 
simply results from a frequent failure of executive control (McVay 
and Kane, 2009; 2010). I would claim that this actually is one of the 
most important functional and phenomenological characteristics of 
human self-consciousness, as a matter of fact, one of its most general, 
principal features: the almost constant presence of subpersonal and 
automatically generated mental activity (as generated by certain parts 
of the extended default mode network; Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner, 
Andrews‐Hanna and Schacter, 2008; Mantini and Vanduffel, 2012), in 
combination with a frequent inability of the executive-control system 
to shield primary-task performance off against interference from these 
subpersonal thought processes (Smallwood et al., 2012). If I am right, 
autonomous cognitive self-control is an exception, not the rule. 
To conclude, we may have to conceive the instantiation of a first-
person perspective and certain necessary conditions of personhood as 
rare, graded, and dynamically variable properties of self-conscious 
cognitive systems — at least in our own case. I have proposed a back-
ground model of subjectivity as autonomous epistemic goal-selection 
at the mental level, with the EAM as the true origin of our consciously 
experienced first-person perspective. As the large majority of our 
mental activity is not driven by explicit, consciously available goal-
representations and cannot, while it is unfolding, be inhibited, 
suspended, or terminated, we are not mentally autonomous subjects 
for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime. At the level of con-
scious mental activity, epistemic agency is the exception, not the rule. 
For human beings, epistemic agency can be differentiated into cog-
nitive agency (CA; the ability to control goal-directed/task-related, 
deliberate thought) and attentional agency (AA; the ability to control 
the focus of attention). For most of their conscious lifetime, human 
beings are neither cognitive nor attentional agents, and they also lack 
an explicit phenomenal self-representation of themselves as currently 
possessing these abilities. Conceptually, most of our conscious 
activity must be characterized as a form of unintentional mental 
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behaviour. Therefore, two thirds of conscious thought can be 
described as a subpersonal process that functionally results from a 
continuously recurring loss of M-autonomy. However, I argued for a 
moderate interpretation of this fact, not in terms of a complete loss of 
the relevant ability, but only as an epistemic deficit, a lack of con-
scious self-knowledge: an absence of representation that is not repre-
sented as an absence. 
From a philosophical perspective, mind-wandering is not a property 
of the person as a whole, but a local dynamics that is determined by a 
set of functional properties physically realized by a specific part of the 
brain. If it is in accordance with our theoretical interests, we may 
choose to describe this dynamics as a representational kind of dyna-
mics. Then we can say that, internally, an individual representational 
token or event only becomes part of a personal-level process by being 
functionally integrated into and actively controlled with the help of a 
specific form of transparent conscious self-representation, the 
‘epistemic agent model’ (EAM), and by being embedded into a highly 
specific sociocultural context. This context may be thought of as pro-
viding an external scaffolding for the stabilization of the EAM — for 
example, by enabling normative practices of mutually ascribing 
personhood to each other, or by realizing a linguistically structured 
cognitive niche in which the concept of a ‘person’ is continuously 
present as an instrument for social as well as mental self-
representation. Here, one important conceptual distinction is the one 
between conscious self-representation of ongoing cognitive or 
attentional agency and a more implicit, passive representation of the 
ability to act as an epistemic agent, involving the more subtle 
phenomenology of knowing about the potential for mental action 
without actually realizing it. Being aware of this ability, also in others, 
suffices for the appearance of a first-person perspective. 
In interdisciplinary discourse, it has now become a standard, and at 
times tiring, job for philosophers to tell neuroscientists that it is the 
person who thinks, and not the brain — a perennial job, it seems, 
because most neuroscientists never seem to really learn. The omni-
present and all too well-known mistake is the ascription of psychol-
ogical predicates to parts of a person’s brain (e.g. ‘The prefrontal 
cortex plans actions’; ‘The premotor cortex decides on the initiation 
and organization of own movement sequences’; and so on). The con-
ceptual error of ascribing a property that can only be ascribed to the 
whole entity to a part of it (called the ‘mereological fallacy’; see 
Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 72) often, but not necessarily, 
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accompanies the explanatory error of ascribing mental properties to 
subpersonal explananda (the ‘homunculus fallacy’; for a lucid 
discussion, see Drayson 2012, Section 2.2). Ironically, if what I have 
said above is correct, then at least some neuroscientists, in all their 
slightly indocile stubbornness, may actually have had a better intuition 
than philosophers: if for more than two thirds of our conscious life-
time ‘thought’ should better be described as an unintentional, sub-
personal process, then most of the time it really is the brain that thinks 
— and not us. 
References 
Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Reidler, J.S., Huang, C. & Buckner, R.L. (2010) Evidence 
for the default network’s role in spontaneous cognition, Journal of Neuro-
physiology, 104, pp. 322–335. 
Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (eds.) (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bennett, M.R. & Hacker, P.M.S. (2003) Philosophical Foundations of Neuro-
science, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bickle, J. (2013) Multiple realizability, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, Spring 2013 Edition, [Online], http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2013/entries/multiple-realizability/. 
Bigelsen, J. & Schupak, C. (2011) Compulsive fantasy: Proposed evidence of an 
under-reported syndrome through a systematic study of 90 self-identified non-
normative fantasizers, Consciousness & Cognition, 20, pp. 1634–1648. 
Blanke, O. & Metzinger, T. (2009) Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal 
selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, pp. 7–13. 
Brass, M. & Haggard, P. (2007) To do or not to do: The neural signature of self-
control, Journal of Neuroscience, 27, pp. 9141–9145. 
Brentano, F. (1874/1973) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, McAlister, L. 
(ed.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Buckner, R.L. & Carroll, D.C. (2007) Self-projection and the brain, Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11, pp. 49–57. 
Buckner, R.L., Andrews-Hanna, J.R. & Schacter, D.L. (2008) The brain’s default 
network, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, pp. 1–38. 
Campbell-Meiklejohn, D.K., Woolrich, M.W., Passingham, R.E. & Rogers, R.D. 
(2008) Knowing when to stop: The brain mechanisms of chasing losses, 
Biological Psychiatry, 63, pp. 293–300. 
Carruthers, P. (2015) The Centered Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D.J. (2000) What is a neural correlate of consciousness?, in Metzinger, 
T. (ed.) Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual 
Questions, pp. 17–39, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Christoff, K. (2012) Undirected thought: Neural determinants and correlates, Brain 
Research, 1428, pp. 51–59. 
Christoff, K., Gordon, A.M., Smallwood, J., Smith, R. & Schooler, J.W. (2009) 
Experience sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system 
contributions to mind wandering,. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 106, pp. 8719–8724. 
 298 T.  METZINGER 
 
Clarke, A. (2015) Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied 
Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, A.-L. (2013) Attentional decoupling while pursuing intentions: A form of 
mind wandering?, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p. 693. 
Corballis, M.C. (2013) Wandering tales: Evolutionary origins of mental time travel 
and language, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p. 485. 
Damasio, A.R. & van Hoesen, G.W. (1983) Emotional disturbances associated 
with focal lesions of the limbic frontal lobe, Neuropsychology of Humam 
Emotion, 1, pp. 85–110. 
Dennett, D.C. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA: Little Brown. 
Dorsch, F. (2014) Focused daydreaming and mind-wandering, Review of Philos-
ophy and Psychology, pp. 1–23, [Online], http://link.springer.com/article/ 
10.1007%2Fs13164-014-0221-4. 
Drayson, Z. (2012) The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction, 
Philosophical Perspectives, 26, pp. 1–18. 
Dresler, M., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V.I., Koch, S.P., Holsboer, F., Steiger, A., et 
al. (2012) Neural correlates of dream lucidity obtained from contrasting lucid 
versus non-lucid REM sleep: A combined EEG/fMRI case study, SLEEP, 35, 
pp. 1017–1020. 
Filevich, E., Kühn, S. & Haggard, P. (2012) Intentional inhibition in human action: 
The power of ‘no’, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, pp. 1107–
1118. 
Filevich, E., Kühn, S. & Haggard, P. (2013) There is no free won’t: Antecedent 
brain activity predicts decisions to inhibit, PLoSONE, 8, e53053. 
Fosse, R., Stickgold, R. & Hobson, J.A. (2001) Brain-mind states: Reciprocal 
variation in thoughts and hallucinations, Psychological Science, 12, pp. 30–36. 
Fox, K.C.R., Nijeboer, S., Solomonova, E., Domhoff, G.W. & Christoff, K. (2013) 
Dreaming as mind wandering: Evidence from functional neuroimaging and first-
person content reports, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, p. 412. 
Fox, K.C.R., Spreng, R.N., Ellamil, M., Andrews-Hanna, J.R. & Christoff, K. 
(2015) The wandering brain: Meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies 
of mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes, Neuroimage, 
111, pp. 611–621. 
Friston, K. (2010) The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory?, Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 11, pp. 127–138. 
Garrison, K.A., Santoyo, J.F., Davis, J.H., Thornhill, I.V., Thomas, A., Kerr, C.E. 
& Brewer, J.A. (2013) Effortless awareness: Using real time neurofeedback to 
investigate correlates of posterior cingulate cortex activity in meditators’ self-
report, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7 (440), pp. 1–9. 
Gay, P., Schmidt, R.E. & van der Linden, M. (2011) Impulsivity and intrusive 
thoughts: Related manifestations of self-control difficulties?, Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 35, pp. 293–303. 
Green, C.E. (1994) Lucid Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep, 
Hove: PsychologyPress. 
Hasenkamp, W., Wilson-Mendenhall, C.D., Duncan, E. & Barsalou, L.W. (2012) 
Mind wandering and attention during focused meditation: A fine-grained 
temporal analysis of fluctuating cognitive states, Neuroimage, 59 (1), pp. 750–
760. 
Hippel, W. von & Trivers, R. (2011) The evolution and psychology of self-
deception, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34 (1), pp. 1–56. 
  M-AUTONOMY 299 
 
Hobson, J.A. (2002) Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hohwy, J. (2013) The Predictive Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hölzel, B.K., Lazar, S.W., Gard, T., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Vago, D.R. & Ott, U. 
(2011) How does mindfulness meditation work? Proposing mechanisms of 
action from a conceptual and neural perspective, Perspectives in Psychological 
Science, 6, pp. 537–559. 
Horovitz, S.G., Braun, A.R., Carr, W.S., Picchioni, D., Balkin, T.J., Fukunaga, M., 
et al. (2009) Decoupling of the brain’s default mode network during deep sleep, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, pp. 11376–11381. 
Irving, Z.C. (2015) Mind-wandering is unguided attention: Accounting for the 
‘purposeful’ wanderer, Philosophical Studies, pp. 1–25, [Online], http://link. 
springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-015-0506-1. 
Kane, M.J., Brown, L.H., McVay, J.C., Silvia, P.J., Myin-Germeys, I. & Kwapil, 
T.R. (2007) For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling 
study of working memory and executive control in daily life, Psychological 
Science, 18, pp. 614–621. 
Killingsworth, M.A. & Gilbert, D.T. (2010) A wandering mind is an unhappy 
mind, Science, 330, p. 932. 
Klinger, E. (2013) Goal commitments and the content of thoughts and dreams: 
Basic principles, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p. 415. 
Kühn, S., Haggard, P. & Brass, M. (2009) Intentional inhibition: How the ‘veto-
area’ exerts control, Human Brain Mapping, 30, pp. 2834–2843. 
Limanowski, J. & Blankenburg, F. (2013) Minimal self-models and the free 
energy principle, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, p. 547. 
Lu, H., Zou, Q., Gu, H., Raichle, M.E., Stein, E.A. & Yang, Y. (2012) Rat brains 
also have a default mode network, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 109, pp. 3979–3984. 
Mantini, D. & Vanduffel, W. (2012) Emerging roles of the brain’s default net-
work, Neuroscientist, 19, pp. 76–87. 
Mason, M.F., Norton, M.I., Van Horn, J.D., Wegner, D.M., Grafton, S.T., et al. 
(2007) Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent 
thought, Science, 315, pp. 393–395. 
McCauley, R.N. & Bechtel, W. (2001) Explanatory pluralism and heuristic 
identity theory, Theory & Psychology, 11, pp. 736–760. 
McVay, J.C. & Kane, M.J. (2009) Conducting the train of thought: Working 
memory capacity, goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control 
task, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 35, 
p. 196. 
McVay, J.C. & Kane, M.J. (2010) Does mind wandering reflect executive function 
or executive failure? Comment on Smallwood and Schooler (2006) and Watkins 
(2008), Psychological Bulletin, 136, pp. 188–197. 
McVay, J.C. & Kane, M.J. (2013) Dispatching the wandering mind? Toward a 
laboratory method for cuing ‘spontaneous’ off-task thought, Frontiers in 
Psychology, 4, p. 570. 
Metzinger, T. (ed.) (1995) Conscious Experience, Exeter: Imprint Academic. 
Metzinger, T. (2003a) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Metzinger, T. (2003b) Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, pp. 353–393. 
 300 T.  METZINGER 
 
Metzinger, T. (2006) Précis: Being no one, Psyche (Stuttg), 11, pp. 1–35. 
Metzinger, T. (2007) Self models, Scholarpedia, 2, p. 4174. 
Metzinger, T. (2008) Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of sub-
jectivity: A brief summary with examples, Progress in Brain Research, 168, pp. 
215–278. 
Metzinger, T. (2013a) The myth of cognitive agency: Subpersonal thinking as a 
cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy, Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (931), 
[Online], http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931/abstract 
Metzinger, T. (2013b) Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example 
of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research, Frontiers 
in Psychology, 4 (746), [Online], http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/ 
fpsyg.2013.00746/abstract. 
Metzinger, T. (2014) First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-
order embodiment, in Shapiro, L. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Embodied 
Cognition, London: Routledge. 
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J.M. (2014) Die phänomenale Signatur des Wissens: 
Experimentelle Philosophie des Geistes mit oder ohne Intuitionen?, in 
Grundmann, T., Horvath, J. & Kipper, J. (eds.) Die Experimentelle Philosophie 
in der Diskussion, Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J.M. (2015) What does it mean to have an open mind?, in 
Metzinger, T. & Windt, J.M. (eds.) OpenMIND, Frankfurt am Main: MIND 
Group, [Online], http://open-mind.net/papers/general-introduction-what-does-it-
mean-to-have-an-open-mind/paperPDF. 
Mooneyham, B.W. & Schooler, J.W. (2013) The costs and benefits of mind-
wandering: A review, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, pp. 
11–18. 
Mrazek, M.D., Smallwood, J. & Schooler, J.W. (2012) Mindfulness and mind- 
wandering: Finding convergence through opposing constructs, Emotion, 12, p. 
442. 
Nielsen, T.A. (2000) A review of mentation in REM and NREM sleep: ‘Covert’ 
REM sleep as a possible reconciliation of two opposing models, Behavioral & 
Brain Sciences, 23, pp. 851–866. 
Noreika, V., Valli, K., Lahtela, H. & Revonsuo, A. (2009) Early-night serial 
awakenings as a new paradigm for studies on NREM dreaming, International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 74, pp. 14–18. 
Noreika, V., Windt, J.M., Lenggenhager, B. & Karim, A.A. (2010) New 
perspectives for the study of lucid dreaming: From brain stimulation to 
philosophical theories of self-consciousness, International Journal of Dream 
Research, 3, pp. 36–45. 
Pliushch, I. & Metzinger, T. (2015) Self-deception and the dolphin model of 
cognition, in Gennaro, R.J. (ed.) Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on 
Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Raichle, M.E., MacLeod, A.M., Snyder, A.Z., Powers, W.J., Gusnard, D.A. & 
Shulman, G.L. (2001) Inaugural article: A default mode of brain function, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98, pp. 676–682. 
Redshaw, J. & Suddendorf, T. (2013) Foresight beyond the very next event: Four- 
year-olds can link past and deferred future episodes, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
p. 404. 
  M-AUTONOMY 301 
 
Samann, P.G., Wehrle, R., Hoehn, D., Spoormaker, V.I., Peters, H., Tully, C., et 
al. (2011) Development of the brain’s default mode network from wakefulness 
to slow wave sleep, Cerebral Cortex, 21, pp. 2082–2093. 
Schmidt, R.E. & van der Linden, M. (2009) The aftermath of rash action: Sleep-
interfering counterfactual thoughts and emotions, Emotion, 9, pp. 549–553. 
Schmidt, R.E., Harvey, A.G. & van der Linden, M. (2011) Cognitive and affective 
control in insomnia, Frontiers in Psychology, 2, p. 349. 
Schooler, J.W., Smallwood, J., Christoff, K., Handy, T.C., Reichle, E.D. & 
Sayette, M.A. (2011) Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering 
mind, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, pp. 319–326. 
Schupak, C. & Rosenthal, J. (2009) Excessive daydreaming: A case history and 
discussion of mind wandering and high fantasy proneness, Consciousness & 
Cognition, 18, pp. 290–292. 
Seth, A.K. (2010) Measuring autonomy and emergence via granger causality, 
Artificial Life, 16, pp. 179–196. 
Siclari, F., La Rocque, J.J., Postle, B.R. & Tononi, G. (2013) Assessing sleep 
consciousness within subjects using a serial awakening paradigm, Frontiers in 
Psychology, 4, p. 542. 
Slagter, H.A., Davidson, R.J. & Lutz, A. (2011) Mental training as a tool in the 
neuroscientific study of brain and cognitive plasticity, Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 5, p. 17. 
Smallwood, J. (2013) Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: A process- 
occurrence framework for self-generated mental activity, Psychological 
Bulletin, 139, p. 519. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M. & Schooler, J.W. (2007) The lights are on but no 
one’s home: Meta-awareness and the decoupling of attention when the mind 
wanders, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, pp. 527–533. 
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M. & Schooler, J.W. (2008) When attention matters: 
The curious incident of the wandering mind, Memory and Cognition, 36 (6), pp. 
1144–1150. 
Smallwood, J., Brown, K., Baird, B. & Schooler, J.W. (2012) Cooperation 
between the default mode network and the frontal-parietal network in the 
production of an internal train of thought, Brain Research, 1428, pp. 60–70. 
Smallwood, J. & Schooler, J.W. (2015) The science of mind wandering: 
Empirically navigating the stream of consciousness, Annual Review of 
Psychology, 66, pp. 487–518. 
Spreng, R.N., Mar, R.A. & Kim, A.S.N. (2009) The common neural basis of auto-
biographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind, and the default 
mode: A quantitative meta-analysis, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, pp. 
489–510. 
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Maquet, P., D’Argembeau, A. & Gilbert, S. (2011) 
Neural correlates of ongoing conscious experience: Both task-unrelatedness and 
stimulus-independence are related to default network activity, PLoSONE, 6, 
e16997. 
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda, L.J.-F., Bruno, M.-A., 
Boveroux, P., Schnakers, C., et al. (2010) Default network connectivity reflects 
the level of consciousness in non-communicative brain-damaged patients, Brain, 
133, pp. 161–171. 
 302 T.  METZINGER 
 
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Tuin, I. & Hobson, J. (2009) Lucid dreaming: A state of 
consciousness with features of both waking and non-lucid dreaming, Sleep, 32, 
p. 1191. 
Voss, U., Schermelleh-Engel, K., Windt, J., Frenzel, C. & Hobson, A. (2013) 
Measuring consciousness in dreams: The lucidity and consciousness in dreams 
scale, Consciousness & Cognition, 22, pp. 8–21. 
Voss, U. & Hobson, A. (2015) What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming?, in 




Wamsley, E.J. (2013) Dreaming as an extension of waking conscious experience 
and a tractable problem for cognitive neuroscience, Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
p. 637. 
Ward, A.F. & Wegner, D.M. (2013) Mind-blanking: When the mind goes away, 
Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p. 650. 
Wegner, D.M. (2002) The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Weissman, D.H., Roberts, K.C., Visscher, K.M. & Woldorff, M.G. (2006) The 
neural bases of momentary lapses in attention, Nature Neuroscience, 9, pp. 971–
978. 
Windt, J.M. (2014) Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind 
and Empirical Research, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Windt, J.M. (2015) Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind 
and Empirical Research, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Windt, J.M. & Metzinger, T. (2007) The philosophy of dreaming and self- 
consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream state?, 
in Praeger Perspectives: The New Science of Dreaming, Vol. 3., Cultural and 
Theoretical Perspectives, pp. 193–247, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers/ 
Greenwood Publishing Group. 
